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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
TORTS -APPLICATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
TO AUTOMOBILES
The purpose of this article is an examination into the utilization of
res ipsa loquitur in connection with automobile accidents, with particu-
lar attention to its efficacy in Wisconsin. The difficulties inherent in the
application of this rule are exceeded only by the conflict of opinion that
surrounds its proper procedural effect. For this reason, a topical method
of exposition treating some of the more frequent type situations in-
volved in automobile litigation, seems best employed.
Briefly expresed, the rule states that the fact of occurrence of an
injury and the circumstances that surround it may permit an inference
or presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant. The essential
elements of the doctrine call for an injury from an instrumentality
which, barring careless construction, inspection or user, does not ordi-
narily result in injury; exclusive control on the part of the party
charged," and lack of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Sometimes
a fourth element, greater knowledge of the true cause of the injury on
the part of the party charged, is added. 2
Wisconsin courts have been sparing in applying the rule to auto-
mobile collisions, the court in Linden v. Miller,3 said:
"... As a rule in auto collisions the direct cause of the accident
and the controlling circumstances attendant thereon are usually
not so within the control of a driver as to raise a presumption
of negligence on his part. In other words, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not usually apply to such accidents...."
They have not said that res ipsa loquitur will not be applied in auto-
mobile cases, but they have inferred that it is available only in unusual
and extraordinary situations. This view is in harmony with most au-
thorities and entirely in keeping with the principle that the character
of the accident, rather than the fact of the accident, determines whether
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. It doesn't apply where the ac-
'What is meant here is not mere control over the mechanism causing injury or
damage, but exclusive control over the probable causative factors of the in-
ju.y or damage. "All that is necessary is that the defendant have exclusive
control of the factors which apparently have caused the accident..." Prosser
on Torts, sec. 43, p. 298 (1941). So, if several alternative possible causes
are present, some of which were not under the exclusive control of the de-
fendant, and these non-exclusively controlled factors can be shown to have
a possible causal connection with the accident, the doctrine will not be applied.
In reference to the plaintiff's problem of showing the exclusive control ele-
ment, note the following statement of the court in Rocono v. Guy F. Atkin-
son Co., 173 F.(2d) 661 (9th cir., 1949):
"The plain implication of the case is that it is not necessary, as a prerequisite
to the application of the rule, that the party having the burden of proof of
negligence establish by direct or conclusive evidence that his adversary had
exclusive control of the causitive instrumentalities."
2 Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 9, sec. 2509 (1940).
3 172 Wis. 20, 177 N.W. 909 (1920).
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cident may have arisen from one or more causes, . . . where there is
evidence as to the cause, or where specific negligence is alleged.'
The rule is not a substitute for proof of negligence, it is a method
of proving it in cases where common experience teaches that the physi-
cal forces producing an accident do not ordinarily exist in the absence
of negligence. The maxim is thus applicable only where an injury can-
not be otherwise explained.
COLLISIONS BETWEEN AUTOMOBILES
The possible causative factors involved in a collision between two
moving vehicles are so numerous that it is virtually impossible to show
the defendant's exclusive control over the factors producing the acci-
dent necessary to the application of res ipsa loquitur. Hence the doc-
trine is held inappropriate in situations of this type, and the courts of
Wisconsin have denied its application where no direct evidence of how
such an accident occurred is shown, and the facts indicate that it may
as readily be ascribed to a non-actionable as well as an actionable cause,
holding that it is not within the proper province of a jury to guess
where the truth lies and make that the foundation for a verdict.5
In Seligman v. Hammond,6 a car driven by deceased defendant
swerved over the center line of a highway into the lane of oncoming
traffic, and struck the plaintiff's car. After the accident it was discov-
ered that the front left tire on the defendant's car was flat, and since
this fact presented a possible non-actionable cause of the collision, the
jury decided the case in favor of the defendant. The trial court ignored
the verdict and found for the plaintiff, but was reversed by the Su-
preme Court which held that mere presence of defendant's car in the
left hand lane did not, without more, establish liability. The problem
of blowouts in relation to res ipsa loquitur was discussed in a more de-
tailed manner in the case of Pawlowski v. Eskofski7 where the court
said:
"The only other possible basis for upholding the finding of the
jury as to defendant's negligence would be to apply the res ipsa
loquitur rule, which would be to say that blowouts do not ordi-
narily happen in the absence of negligence in driving the car at
the time of the accident, or in failing to inspect or inflate the
tires properly previous to it. It is manifest that the negligence
in driving cannot be so assumed."
Courts of most jurisdictions have with uniformity held that the fact of
the happening of a collision between two automobiles, even if a rear
end collision, without evidence of the circumstances under which it
4 Huddy, Automobile Law, 9th Ed. sec. 157, p. 283 (1931).
5 Hyer v. City of Janesville, 101 Wis. 371, 77 N.W. 729 (1898).
6205 Wis. 199, 236 N.W. 115 (1931).
7 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932).
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happened, is not proof of negligence of the operator of either of them.8
What seems to be an exception to the majority view on this point is to
be found in the Louisiana case of Overstreet v. Ober,9 where the court,
in an action brought by a plaintiff injured in an automobile accident
against her host-driver and the driver of the other car involved, said:
"The two vehicles collided on a straight paved highway, in open
daylight, where there were no obstructions and no other ve-
hicles in sight. Some one was negligent. Res ipsa loquitur."
Perhaps the case may be distinguished from the others by virtue of the
fact that both drivers of the cars involved were defending against a
non-negligent plaintiff. While it is conceivable that unusual cases of
the above nature may arise to warant applicability of the doctrine in
collisions between automobiles, there are no such cases on record in
Wisconsin.
SKIDDING AUTOMOBILES
The applicability of the res ipsa loquitur rule to cases involving
automobile skidding and causing injury or damage has met with the
same objections as found in collisions between automobiles, namely, the
possibility of existence of several causative factors. In Linden v.
Miller,"' a case in which the defendant's car skidded on an icy road and
struck the plaintiff's car, the court stated:
"Skidding may occur without fault, and when it does occur it
may likewise continue without fault for a considerable space and
time. It means partial or complete loss of control of the car un-
der circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. Hence,
plaintiff's claim that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to
the present situation is not well founded. In order to make the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply it must be held that skidding
itself implies negligence. This it does not do."
In another case,"' the fact that defendant's car skidded nine hundred
feet down an icy hill was not of itself evidence of negligence on his
part. In other jurisdictions skidding has been held to constitute evidence
of negligence. Davis v. Brown 2 and Kruzie v. Sanders3 are two Cali-
fornia cases where skidding Was held to be such evidence. In the for-
mer case, the court held that circumstances warranted an inference of
6 Schneider v. Steindler, 188 Wis. 129, 205 N.W. 797 (1925); Holborn v.
Coombs, 209 Wis. 556, 245 N.W. 673 (1932); Handler v. Coffey, 278 Mass.
339, 179 N.E. 901 (1932).
9 14 La. App. 633, 130 So. 648 (1930).
10.Supra, Note 2; accord, Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267 (1926);
Mitchell v. Melts, 220 N.C. 793, 18 S.E. (2d) 406 (1942).
11 Wobosel v. Lee, 209 Wis. 51, 243 N.W. 425 (1931).
22921 Cal. App. 20, 267 P. 754 (1928).
1323 Cal. (2d) 237, 135 P.(2d) 710 (1943). (See also subsequent opinion in
143 P. (2d) 704.
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negligence where an automobile was driven on wet, asphalt pavement
through a tunnel at excessive speed, and skidded, when defendant ap-
plied his brakes, causing a collision with, another car. In the second
case, res ipsa loquitur was applied where defendant's car skidded on
a road which was slippery from rain and the sap from eucalyptus trees.
The Wisconsin viewpoint, in harmony with the majority, that skid-
ding may occur without fault would seem to present in most such cases,
the possibility of both actionable and non-actionable causes and hence
bar the application of the rule. If it could be shown that the skidding
would not have occurred without fault, it is possible that the rule might
be used to create an inference of want of care as to speed, lookout, con-
trol or management, or some other component of negligence.
AUTOS LEAVING THE ROAD
It is in the case of automobiles leaving the traveled portion of the
highway and causing injury or damage, that the rule is most frequently
applied. Even in this type situation, if the circumstances are as con-
sistent with a non-actionable as with an actionable cause, negligence will
not be presumed or inferred. In Klein v. Beeten,14 the defendant's car
suddenly left the road, went into a ditch and injured the plaintiff pas-
senger. After the accident it was found that the front left tire was flat.
The court in refusing to apply res ipsa loquitur said:
"Verdicts cannot rest on guess or conjecture. It is the duty of the
plaintiff to prove negligence affirmatively, and while the infer-
ences allowed by the rule or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur con-
stitute such proof, it is only where the circumstances leave no
room for a different presumption that the maxim applies. Where
it is shown that the accident might have happened as the result
of one of two causes, the reason for the rule fails and it cannot
be invoked."
In a similar case,1 5 where after the accident the steering gear on the de-
fendant's car was found to be broken, the doctrine was held not to apply.
It will be noted that in each of the above cases there is actually an al-
ternative possible cause of the accident, not involving negligent opera-
tion. It is only where the accident is not otherwise explainable that an
inference of negligence is said to arise. In Storlie v. Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Company," no alternative possible cause was found, and
causal negligence of the driver was established. The Wisconsin Court
in a recent decision17 permitted recovery on the basis of res ipsa loqui-
14 169 Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736 (1919).1 5 Baars v. Benda, 249 Wis. 65, 23 N.W. (2d) 477 (1945).
16251 Wis. 340, 28 N.W. (2d) 920 (1947); (The plaintiff was denied recovery
because of assumption of risk).
17 Wisconsin Telephone Company v. Matson, 256 Wis. 304, 41 N.W. (2d) 268
(1950).
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tur in a case where defendant's truck was alleged to have struck a tele-
phone pole belonging to plaintiff company. There were no eye-witnesses
to the accident, but the side of the truck's box was later found to be
damaged and some of its contents were found at the pole. No other
alternative possible cause was shown, and the court said:
"Nothing is left which can rationally explain the collision except
negligence on the part of the driver. There are no circumstances
which leave room for a different presumption.... the record has
eliminated the inferences until only those of negligent operation
remain .... a thing in good mechanical order, under the man-
agement of the defendant or his servants, strikes a roadside in-
stallation belonging to the plaintiff. This is an accident which in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have
the management use proper care. Thus it affords reasonable evi-
dence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. Explanation by the defendant
is withheld so the reasonable evidence of negligence afforded by
the accident itself sustains a finding of causal negligence. In such
circumstances it is immaterial whether the negligence was in re-
spect to lookout, management or control, position on the high-
way or whatever component of negligent driving counsel or the
trial judge might suggest. Selection is unimportant when the res
has spoken and the defendant has not explained."
The above is a clear cut example of the fact that given the proper case
Wisconsin courts will not hesitate to apply res ipsa loquitur to automo-
bile accidents. Their reasoning is completely in harmony with decisions
of courts of other jurisdictions.' s
AUTOMOBILES STRIKING STATIONARY OBJECTS IN THE ROAD
While there are no Wisconsin cases on this type situation, decisions
in other jurisdictions indicate that it is often a proper type to whch to
apply res ipsa loquitor. The situation differs from that of collisions
between automobiles in that here only the defendant's vehicle is in mo-
tion. In the absence of negligence as to the placement by the stationary
object, and other possible causes of the accident, it is fair to assume
that the Wisconson court will follow its reasoning in the case of auto-
mobiles leaving the road. The leading case in the present situation is
that of Bryne v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.19 In that case a truck
hit a large stationary excavator standing near the curb in the daytime.
The court held:
' Brown v. Des Moines Steam Bottling Works, 174 Iowa 715, 156 N.W. 829(1916); Nicol v. Geitler, 188 Minn. 69, 247 N.W. 8 (1933); Zwick v. Zwick,
29 Ohio App. 522, 163 N.E. 917 (1928); Smith v. Hollander, 85 Cal. App.
535, 259 P. 958 (1927).
29269 Mass. 130, 168 N.E. 540 (1929); cf. Morris v. Morris, 84 Cal. App. 599,
258 P. 616 (1927), hitting a pole; Bauhofer v. Crawford, 16 Cal. App. 676, 117
P. 931, (1911), hitting a parked car; Gomer v. Anding, Ct. App. La. 1st Cir.,
146 So. 704 (1933), hitting a bridge.
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"In the ordinary experience of mankind a moving vehicle does
not without negligence of those responsible for it come into col-
lision with a stationary obect the size of an excavator."
The court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the accident.
AUTOMOBILES STARTING AND ROLLING
The doctrine has been successfully applied in this type of situation,
although there are no Wisconsin decisions on the point. In Cleveland
Ice Cream Company v. Cal,20 the court in applying the rule, said:
"The principle of res ipsa loquitur imports that a prima facie
case can be made out without any direct proof of actionable
negligence.... The runaway truck in coming down the hill with-
out anyone in control, speaks for itself, and under the doctrine
under discussion a jury has a basis for inferring that the negli-
gence of the defendant was the cause of the accident."
It should be noted that application of the doctrine has been denied
where the automobile stood safely on a sloping street for a period of
time before rolling down. What period of time of safe standing is re-
quired is questionable, since one case 2' held that ten to twenty minutes
was sufficient, while another" held that five hours was sufficient. In
Glaser v. Schroeder,23 the rule was applied even after the car had been
left standing for a time. Two passengers got into the back seat and the
car then rolled backwards. The court held this was evidence of a defect
or want of repair and negligence in failing to discover and remedy the
same. It is difficult to hazard how the Wisconsin court would hold on a
case of this type, but it would seem reasonable to expect that the doc-
trine would be applied where the circumstances leave no room for a
different presumption.
PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE
There is considerable conflict over the effect that res ipsa loquitur,
once applied, should have on the outcome of the case. The effect given
ranges from a presumption to a permissible inference. The greatest
effect given to the rule is to place on the defendant the ultimate burden
of proof, requiring him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the injury was not caused by his negligence. According to Charles
E. Carpenter, 4 in a majority of jurisdictions the maxim lays down the
basis for a permissible inference by a jury, of negligence on the part
of a defendant. Under this theory the plaintiff could not be non-suited,
nor could he receive a directed verdict. The issue would have to go to
2028 Ohio App. 521, 162 N.E. 812 (1928).
21 Buzzello v. Sramek, 110 Nebr. 36Z 193 N.W. 743 (1923).
22 Joseph v. Schwartz, 128 Wash. 634, 224 P. 5 (1924).
23269 Mass. 337, 168 N.E. 809 (1929).
24 1 Univ. Chicago L. Rev. 519 (1929).
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the jury. Wisconsin would seem to be in this classification, 25 but Dehmel
v. Smith26 might indicate that a presumption rather than an inference
is raised. Similarly, Cummings v. National Furnace Company,2 7 where
the court said:
"The accident itself was of such a character as to raise a pre-
sumption of negligence either in the character of the machinery
used or in the care with which it was handled;..."
raises the question as to the maxim's procedural effect in Wisconsin.
In several jurisdictions, according to Carpenter,2 8 the rule has the
force of a presumption, and he lists California, Kentucky and Illinois
as states giving it that effect. Whether permitting an inference or rais-
ing a presumption, the evidence used to rebut should be credible and
have some probative force. In a California case,29 the presumption was
overcome by evidence that the defendant was momentarily blinded by
the sun. In Wisconsin it would appear that to rebut the inference raised
by the doctrine either the defendant must satisfactorily explain the
cause or some non-actionable cause must be present in the evidence of
the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
There appears to be a controversy between a growing tendency to
attach liability where ever possible, and making the motorist an in-
surer. In Shea v. Hern,0 the court stated that if the doctrine was held
inapplicable to accidents resulting from the operation of motor ve-
hicles, and evidence to prove the happening and cause of the latter is
not available to the plaintiff, then-
,, many plaintiffs might fail to establish their cases where the
inference of negligence was clear, since it is common knowledge
that many automobile casualties occur without apparent reason,
and injury may result from mere inattention on the part of the
operator of the car, from his fleeting glance to left or right,
which cannot be detected by those seated beside him and of
which he himself may be almost unconscious, from his failure
to call into use those mental processes which control the action
of eyes and hands and feet, and for such lapses, incapable of
accurate determination, an injured person is not without a rem-
edy."
The doctrine is applicable to motor accidents in Wisconsin, albeit in
limited and restricted situations. Perhaps the most clever and astute
25 Kaples v. Orth, 61 Wis. 531, 21 N.W. 633 (1884) ; Klitzske v. Webb, 120 Vis.
254, 97 N.W. 901 (1904) ; Rost v. Roberts, 180 Wis. 207, 192 N.W. 38 (1923).
26200 Wis. 292, 227 N.W. 274 (1930).
27 60 Wis. 603, 18 N.W. 742 (1884).
- Supra, Note 24.
29 Binns v. Standen, 118 Cal. App. 625, 5 P.(2d) 637 (1931).
30 132 Me. 361, 171 A. 248 (1934).
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observation made on the rule is that quoted by Professor Prosser 3' in
a review of a book on the lighter side of law: "Loquitur vere; sed quid
in inferno vult dicere?"
HuGa R. O'CONNELL
3' 21 Minn. L. Rev. 475 (1936-37).
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